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Moral Luck and Libertaranism (Cow Goes Moo)
| slim_shady_man | 06/20/12 |
| The Master | 06/20/12 |
| slim_shady_man | 06/20/12 |
| Lib praising Zimbabwe's Gini coefficient | 06/20/12 |
| " " " " | 06/20/12 |
| slim_shady_man | 06/20/12 |
| jake from statefarm | 06/20/12 |
| fscknut | 06/21/12 |
| fscknut | 06/20/12 |
| Pat the Cat | 06/21/12 |
| jake from statefarm | 06/21/12 |
| ,.,,..,,.,.,..:,,:,...,:::,.,.,:,.,.:.,:.,:.,:, | 06/21/12 |
| jake from statefarm | 06/21/12 |
Poast new message in this thread
Date: June 20th, 2012 9:38 PM
I begin with the assumption that there is something wrong about resultant moral luck qua luck--that to admit resultant moral luck is to render the agent's moral profile unsatisfactorily beyond her control. This assumption leads me to rule out the character view of moral profiles. Any control principle that cuts against resultant moral luck will cut just as strongly against any view on which character (or some set of states) constitutes the agent's moral profile.
But since compatibilism with respect to the free will and determinism grounds the freedom of an act in the character (or states) of the agent, it appears that any compatibilist view on which our free acts are the determinants of our moral profile will also be suspect. Similar comments will hold for any counterfactual view--on which both our actual acts and our counterfactual acts are what matter. If we assume determinism across worlds, any such view will entail the intolerable result that our moral profiles are indistinguishable--unless they are distinguished in ways that are already unavailable to the opponent of moral luck.
The result is that, if we deny resultant moral luck qua luck, we are left with two libertarian views--one on which our libertarian acts are what matter and one on which our libertarian actual and counterfactual behavior matter. The first view is saddled with situational moral luck. The second has a prospect of avoiding all moral luck, but only by making appeal to a deviant notion of control, on which one can control X even if one cannot change X. |
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Date: June 20th, 2012 9:40 PM |
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Date: June 20th, 2012 9:44 PM Husband: You know, wife, you behaved like a real shrew when you were in labor with our son. Wife: Excuse me? You go through labor and see how you behave! Husband: Ah, but you see, I’m essentially a man.
So there are no metaphysically possible circumstances in which I go through labor. Face it, your moral profile is stained in a way that mine is not. So I have at least some evidence that I am morally better than you. There are several problems with what the husband says here, aside from the fact that he is acting like a tactless prig. The idea that our sex is essential to us is dubious. The idea that it’s metaphysically impossible for a man to go through labor is suspicious. |
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Date: June 20th, 2012 9:44 PM |
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Date: June 20th, 2012 9:45 PM |
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Date: June 20th, 2012 9:47 PM
I understand the right to liberty as a prohibition on the initiation of force. I argue that if that is what the right to liberty is, then the enforcement of property rights violates it. My conclusion is that libertarianism is, in a sense, impossible because conceptually unsound. In other words, my conclusion is that libertarianism is a hodgepodge of bullshit. |
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Date: June 20th, 2012 10:05 PM |
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Date: June 21st, 2012 12:01 AM |
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Date: June 20th, 2012 11:59 PM |
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Date: June 21st, 2012 12:04 AM |
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Date: June 21st, 2012 12:39 AM |
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Date: June 21st, 2012 12:44 AM |
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Date: June 21st, 2012 12:48 AM |