https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/what-the-china-coast-guard-plan-ship-collision-reveals-about-chinas-military-capabilities/

What the China Coast Guard-PLAN Ship Collision Reveals About China’s Military Capabilities

This incident not only illustrates the continued tensions in the South China Sea but also provides an opportunity to evaluate China’s maritime capabilities.

By Ying Yu Lin

August 30, 2025

What the China Coast Guard-PLAN Ship Collision Reveals About China’s Military Capabilities

A screengrab of a video released by the Philippine Coast Guard showing a collision between a Chinese navy vessel and a patrol ship from the China Coast Guard, close to Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, on August 11, 2025.

Credit: Video from X/Jay Tarriela

In August 2025, near the disputed waters around Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, a collision occurred while a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) destroyer and a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel were pursuing a Philippine patrol craft. Footage released by the Philippines showed the coast guard ship’s bow suffering severe damage, while the navy vessel’s bow was also struck, forcing both ships to return to Yulin Naval Base for repairs. The Philippine patrol vessel, however, remained unscathed.

This incident not only illustrates the continued tensions in the South China Sea but also provides an opportunity to evaluate China’s maritime capabilities.

The accident involved the PLAN’s 7,500-ton Type 052D destroyer Guilin and the 1,500-ton CCG vessel 3104, compared to the 350-ton Philippine patrol boat BRP Suluan. China’s vessels were arguably oversized and not ideally suited for such missions. The Guilin accelerated too quickly and likely misjudged visual blind spots and performance differences between itself and the CCG vessel, leading to the collision.

Following the incident, China immediately dispatched the Type 903 replenishment ship Honghu (hull number 906), which is equipped with hospital-grade medical facilities and personnel. That suggests significant casualties aboard the coast guard ship.

This accident also highlights command and control problems in China’s so-called “maritime rights protection” operations in the South China Sea. Despite the successive rounds of military reforms starting in 2016 – which established the principle of “theater commands in charge of operations, services in charge of force building,” integrated the coast guard and armed police, and promoted trilateral military-police-civilian joint exercises – coordination issues between the navy and the coast guard remain. In this collision, each acted independently, revealing persistent shortcomings in joint operations.

While in theory the Theater Joint Command should unify command, in practice China’s navy and coast guard still report to separate chains of command with differing missions. This gap is also evident in exercises such as the 2025 “Strait Thunder” drill, where the CCG and the PLAN used completely different operational plans and code names. Their cooperation often appears superficial, with serious deficiencies in actual coordination.

It is notable that the CCG vessel involved in the collision had originally been transferred from the navy, meaning communications systems and crew training should not have posed technical barriers. The problem, therefore, lies in the command structure.

Another key point to watch is the time required to restore the damaged vessels to combat readiness. In the Pacific War, the U.S. Navy managed to rapidly repair the USS Yorktown after it was damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea, enabling it to fight at Midway and decisively influence the outcome. This underscores the importance of maintenance and repair capacity. How quickly the PLA can return its vessels to frontline duty after this collision is a key measure of China’s maritime strength.

For the China Coast Guard, however, vessel 3104 was formerly the PLAN frigate Ningde (Type 056). It was stripped of torpedoes and missiles in 2022 and converted into a patrol ship with added water cannons. Thus, the question arises: should China invest resources to repair it at all, or simply replace it?

China’s rapid naval shipbuilding has often been likened to “dumplings being dropped into the pot.” But for such capabilities to be effectively employed, personnel quality, interagency coordination, and command systems must keep pace with hardware growth. Ultimately, no matter how advanced the equipment, it is humans who must operate it. The PLA’s response and follow-up actions after this accident will be important to watch.

It is also worth noting that shortly after the incident, a U.S. Navy destroyer conducted a routine patrol in the South China Sea. Beijing claimed it had expelled the “intruding” U.S. vessel, though Washington denied this. This reflects U.S. support for the Philippines on South China Sea issues. The PLA, meanwhile, rapidly dispatched reinforcements to the area, indicating Beijing’s concern over leaving a power vacuum and its desire to minimize the incident’s impact. Still, casualties aboard the CCG ship were likely significant, and developments bear close monitoring.

Beijing’s primary objective is to pressure Manila while testing the stance of the United States under President Donald Trump. U.S. forces are directly stationed in Japan and South Korea, where Washington has emphasized increased host-nation defense spending. With the Philippines, however, there is no permanent force of U.S. troops, although a mutual defense treaty exists. Military cooperation instead plays out through the rotational activation of small- and medium-sized bases and the deployment of new missile systems to counter PLA actions in the South China Sea. Thus, China’s actions are also intended to probe Trump’s approach to allies and the limits of U.S. security commitments in the first island chain.

For Taiwan, the ship collision is also worth watching. It provides not only a window into PLA capabilities but also a warning. China is likely to intensify trilateral military-police-civilian joint exercises at sea and could apply such practices around Taiwan’s waters. Unlike the Philippines, which benefits from direct U.S. support, Taiwan could become the PLA’s preferred “exercise target” to refine maritime coordination. This represents a risk requiring careful attention going forward.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5768946&forum_id=2!#49230894)

> In August 2025

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5768946&forum_id=2!#49230902)

Oh what a great analogy. The author sure knows a lot about navies and wars and shit

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5768946&forum_id=2!#49231023)