Josh Wingrove

@josh_wingrove

·

1h

NEWS: Trump is set to sign a proclamation adding a $100,000 fee to H-1B visa applications, moving to overhaul a system the administration thinks is too easily abused right now -- undercutting American workers, particularly in STEM fields. He'll sign as soon as today, we're told.

Aaron Reichlin-Melnick

@ReichlinMelnick

Almost certainly illegal and likely to be struck down in court. Congress has only authorized the government to set fees to recover the cost of adjudicating the application. There is no statutory authority to impose fees designed to limit the use of a visa.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284620)

Your scam is over, worthless asshole

No one wants you here

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285388)

u have it reverse, birdshits need turds to do anything now (other than raping azngirls)

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284653)

Without whites you’d have died in the slums of Mumbai long ago

Suck our cocks and be grateful , Dalit trash

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285393)

They’re unqualified scammers who don’t assimilate and add no value

Fuck off

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285390)

h1b abuse is a problem. but he comes up with the dumbest possible way to attack it

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284669)

High.

Ashkenazi.

IQ.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284697)

its also lolzy that even if this as legal if its just 100k per applicant instead of per year then comps wont care cause if they each turd is gonna stay 5y then thats 20k a year, which is prob tax deductible too

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284715)

ljl furk the usa

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284742)

u benchods

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284749)

1. Authority Over Immigration Fees

Congress sets immigration law. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) governs visas, including H-1B.

USCIS (part of DHS) sets fees, but only within authority granted by Congress. Under 8 U.S.C. §1356(m), USCIS may charge fees to recover the “full costs of providing adjudication services,” but those fees must be reasonably tied to costs, not arbitrary revenue raising.

President cannot set fees directly. The President can issue executive orders or influence agency rulemaking, but fees must still comply with the law and administrative procedure.

2. Statutory Issues

A $100,000 fee is not “cost recovery.” Adjudicating an H-1B petition costs a few hundred dollars, not six figures. That gap would be indefensible under the statute.

Congress has in the past set supplemental fees (e.g., the $4,000 fee on some large H-1B/L-1 employers under Pub. L. 111-230), but those required specific legislation, not presidential action.

3. Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

To raise fees, DHS/USCIS must go through notice-and-comment rulemaking.

An arbitrary $100,000 fee would be vulnerable to challenge as arbitrary and capricious under the APA, since it isn’t tied to costs or statutory purpose.

4. Constitutional Issues

Nondelegation & separation of powers: Only Congress can authorize revenue-raising measures of this scale.

Due process & equal protection: A fee so excessive that it effectively bars access could be challenged as unconstitutional discrimination (though courts usually defer heavily in immigration).

5. International/Trade Issues

The U.S. has obligations under WTO/GATS Mode 4 and treaties with India and others. A $100,000 fee targeted at H-1Bs could be argued as a trade barrier or violation of treaty commitments.

6. Practical Reality

If a president tried this by executive order, lawsuits would be filed immediately by:

Tech companies

Immigration advocacy groups

Possibly foreign governments

Courts would likely strike it down quickly as beyond executive authority and contrary to statute.

✅ Bottom line:

The president cannot legally charge $100,000 per H-1B visa without new legislation from Congress. Any attempt to do so unilaterally would run into statutory, administrative, constitutional, and international law problems, and would almost certainly be invalidated in court.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284903)

1) It’s not a USCIS “fee” at all—it’s a lawful condition on entry imposed by the President

The White House proclamation does not purport to change USCIS’s fee schedule under 8 U.S.C. § 1356(m). It uses the President’s independent authority under INA § 212(f) and § 215(a) to “suspend” or “impose…restrictions” on the entry of a class of nonimmigrants when he finds their entry “detrimental” to U.S. interests. The proclamation restricts entry of H-1B workers outside the U.S. unless the employer has made a $100,000 payment, for a defined 12-month period, with national-interest waivers available. That is a classic § 212(f)/§ 215(a) entry restriction—not an agency user fee.

2) Supreme Court precedent gives the President very broad § 212(f)/§ 215(a) leeway

In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court emphasized § 212(f) “exudes deference” and upheld sweeping entry restrictions so long as the President articulates a facially legitimate rationale. Here, the proclamation recites labor-market and national-security findings and tailors the measure (time-limited; outside-U.S. only; national-interest waivers). Under Kleindienst v. Mandel, that easily clears the “facially legitimate and bona fide” threshold. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council likewise recognizes robust presidential power in the entry context.

3) The APA doesn’t apply to the President; agencies can implement immediately under recognized exceptions

Challenges framed as “arbitrary and capricious fee-setting” miss the mark: a presidential proclamation is not subject to APA notice-and-comment, and the President is not an “agency.” See Franklin v. Massachusetts and Dalton v. Specter. Any implementing instructions by DHS/DOS ride the foreign-affairs and/or good-cause exceptions in 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) and § 553(b)(B), particularly where the proclamation itself supplies the governing rule of decision (no entry/visa issuance absent the payment).

4) § 1356(m) “cost-recovery” limits are irrelevant here

Petitioners will argue a six-figure amount can’t be cost-tethered under § 1356(m). But the government answer is simple: this payment is not a USCIS adjudication fee—it is a condition on entry imposed by the President under § 212(f)/§ 215(a). As such, § 1356(m) and OMB Circular A-25 don’t constrain the President’s proclamation. To the extent funds are collected, they are deposited consistent with the Miscellaneous Receipts Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3302, avoiding any “unlawful revenue-raising” theory.

5) “Major Questions” and post-Chevron arguments don’t move the needle

Loper Bright (no Chevron) and West Virginia v. EPA (major questions) target agency gap-filling. Here, Congress itself spoke clearly in § 212(f): the President may “impose…any restrictions” on entry he deems appropriate upon a detriment finding. Courts have already treated § 212(f) as an unusually explicit delegation, and Hawaii controls the standard of review. Even if “major questions” were invoked, the clear-statement is in § 212(f)’s text, repeatedly upheld by the Court.

6) Constitutional claims face the plenary-power and consular nonreviewability wall

Noncitizens abroad have minimal constitutional protections in the entry context; U.S. employers have no fundamental right to sponsor a particular foreign worker. Kerry v. Din reaffirms that citing a statutory ground or stated rationale suffices. Under Mandel, courts don’t “look behind” a facially legitimate reason. And because visa issuance and admission decisions are presumptively nonreviewable, many suits must be routed through ultra vires or narrow statutory channels rather than APA merits review.

7) International/trade objections (WTO/GATS) don’t create a domestic cause of action

The GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons says the agreement does not apply to measures affecting access to a member’s employment market (and U.S. Mode-4 commitments are limited). In any event, WTO agreements are generally non-self-executing in U.S. courts, so they can’t invalidate a domestic proclamation.

8) Distinguishing prior H-1B litigation (e.g., NAM v. DHS)

Plaintiffs will cite the 2020 injunction against PP 10052. But that case involved a categorical suspension by district court order with limited precedential weight and without the Hawaii holding squarely endorsing the precise mechanism used here (a monetized, time-limited restriction with national-interest waivers). Here the government will argue this is narrower (not a total ban), better tailored, and supported by specific findings, bringing it well within Hawaii/Mandel deference.

---

Bottom line framing (for a motion to dismiss / summary judgment):

1. Threshold: This is a Presidential § 212(f)/§ 215(a) proclamation; APA claims fail under Franklin/Dalton.

2. Merits: The proclamation provides a facially legitimate rationale (labor-market and security findings), is time-limited, and includes waivers → valid under Hawaii/Mandel.

3. Statutory fit: Because this is an entry restriction, not a § 1356(m) user fee, cost-recovery arguments are beside the point; deposits proceed under 31 U.S.C. § 3302.

4. Trade/foreign law: GATS Mode 4 doesn’t apply to employment-market access restrictions and is not self-executing in U.S. courts.

If a court follows Trump v. Hawaii, Mandel, Franklin, and Dalton, the $100,000 payment requirement—properly characterized as a condition on entry under § 212(f)/§ 215(a)—has a credible path to survive judicial review.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285585)

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285272)

1. Authority Over Immigration Fees

Congress sets immigration law. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) governs visas, including H-1B.

USCIS (part of DHS) sets fees, but only within authority granted by Congress. Under 8 U.S.C. §1356(m), USCIS may charge fees to recover the “full costs of providing adjudication services,” but those fees must be reasonably tied to costs, not arbitrary revenue raising.

President cannot set fees directly. The President can issue executive orders or influence agency rulemaking, but fees must still comply with the law and administrative procedure.

2. Statutory Issues

A $100,000 fee is not “cost recovery.” Adjudicating an H-1B petition costs a few hundred dollars, not six figures. That gap would be indefensible under the statute.

Congress has in the past set supplemental fees (e.g., the $4,000 fee on some large H-1B/L-1 employers under Pub. L. 111-230), but those required specific legislation, not presidential action.

3. Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

To raise fees, DHS/USCIS must go through notice-and-comment rulemaking.

An arbitrary $100,000 fee would be vulnerable to challenge as arbitrary and capricious under the APA, since it isn’t tied to costs or statutory purpose.

4. Constitutional Issues

Nondelegation & separation of powers: Only Congress can authorize revenue-raising measures of this scale.

Due process & equal protection: A fee so excessive that it effectively bars access could be challenged as unconstitutional discrimination (though courts usually defer heavily in immigration).

5. International/Trade Issues

The U.S. has obligations under WTO/GATS Mode 4 and treaties with India and others. A $100,000 fee targeted at H-1Bs could be argued as a trade barrier or violation of treaty commitments.

6. Practical Reality

If a president tried this by executive order, lawsuits would be filed immediately by:

Tech companies

Immigration advocacy groups

Possibly foreign governments

Courts would likely strike it down quickly as beyond executive authority and contrary to statute.

✅ Bottom line:

The president cannot legally charge $100,000 per H-1B visa without new legislation from Congress. Any attempt to do so unilaterally would run into statutory, administrative, constitutional, and international law problems, and would almost certainly be invalidated in court.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284904)

1) It’s not a USCIS “fee” at all—it’s a lawful condition on entry imposed by the President

The White House proclamation does not purport to change USCIS’s fee schedule under 8 U.S.C. § 1356(m). It uses the President’s independent authority under INA § 212(f) and § 215(a) to “suspend” or “impose…restrictions” on the entry of a class of nonimmigrants when he finds their entry “detrimental” to U.S. interests. The proclamation restricts entry of H-1B workers outside the U.S. unless the employer has made a $100,000 payment, for a defined 12-month period, with national-interest waivers available. That is a classic § 212(f)/§ 215(a) entry restriction—not an agency user fee.

2) Supreme Court precedent gives the President very broad § 212(f)/§ 215(a) leeway

In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court emphasized § 212(f) “exudes deference” and upheld sweeping entry restrictions so long as the President articulates a facially legitimate rationale. Here, the proclamation recites labor-market and national-security findings and tailors the measure (time-limited; outside-U.S. only; national-interest waivers). Under Kleindienst v. Mandel, that easily clears the “facially legitimate and bona fide” threshold. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council likewise recognizes robust presidential power in the entry context.

3) The APA doesn’t apply to the President; agencies can implement immediately under recognized exceptions

Challenges framed as “arbitrary and capricious fee-setting” miss the mark: a presidential proclamation is not subject to APA notice-and-comment, and the President is not an “agency.” See Franklin v. Massachusetts and Dalton v. Specter. Any implementing instructions by DHS/DOS ride the foreign-affairs and/or good-cause exceptions in 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) and § 553(b)(B), particularly where the proclamation itself supplies the governing rule of decision (no entry/visa issuance absent the payment).

4) § 1356(m) “cost-recovery” limits are irrelevant here

Petitioners will argue a six-figure amount can’t be cost-tethered under § 1356(m). But the government answer is simple: this payment is not a USCIS adjudication fee—it is a condition on entry imposed by the President under § 212(f)/§ 215(a). As such, § 1356(m) and OMB Circular A-25 don’t constrain the President’s proclamation. To the extent funds are collected, they are deposited consistent with the Miscellaneous Receipts Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3302, avoiding any “unlawful revenue-raising” theory.

5) “Major Questions” and post-Chevron arguments don’t move the needle

Loper Bright (no Chevron) and West Virginia v. EPA (major questions) target agency gap-filling. Here, Congress itself spoke clearly in § 212(f): the President may “impose…any restrictions” on entry he deems appropriate upon a detriment finding. Courts have already treated § 212(f) as an unusually explicit delegation, and Hawaii controls the standard of review. Even if “major questions” were invoked, the clear-statement is in § 212(f)’s text, repeatedly upheld by the Court.

6) Constitutional claims face the plenary-power and consular nonreviewability wall

Noncitizens abroad have minimal constitutional protections in the entry context; U.S. employers have no fundamental right to sponsor a particular foreign worker. Kerry v. Din reaffirms that citing a statutory ground or stated rationale suffices. Under Mandel, courts don’t “look behind” a facially legitimate reason. And because visa issuance and admission decisions are presumptively nonreviewable, many suits must be routed through ultra vires or narrow statutory channels rather than APA merits review.

7) International/trade objections (WTO/GATS) don’t create a domestic cause of action

The GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons says the agreement does not apply to measures affecting access to a member’s employment market (and U.S. Mode-4 commitments are limited). In any event, WTO agreements are generally non-self-executing in U.S. courts, so they can’t invalidate a domestic proclamation.

8) Distinguishing prior H-1B litigation (e.g., NAM v. DHS)

Plaintiffs will cite the 2020 injunction against PP 10052. But that case involved a categorical suspension by district court order with limited precedential weight and without the Hawaii holding squarely endorsing the precise mechanism used here (a monetized, time-limited restriction with national-interest waivers). Here the government will argue this is narrower (not a total ban), better tailored, and supported by specific findings, bringing it well within Hawaii/Mandel deference.

---

Bottom line framing (for a motion to dismiss / summary judgment):

1. Threshold: This is a Presidential § 212(f)/§ 215(a) proclamation; APA claims fail under Franklin/Dalton.

2. Merits: The proclamation provides a facially legitimate rationale (labor-market and security findings), is time-limited, and includes waivers → valid under Hawaii/Mandel.

3. Statutory fit: Because this is an entry restriction, not a § 1356(m) user fee, cost-recovery arguments are beside the point; deposits proceed under 31 U.S.C. § 3302.

4. Trade/foreign law: GATS Mode 4 doesn’t apply to employment-market access restrictions and is not self-executing in U.S. courts.

If a court follows Trump v. Hawaii, Mandel, Franklin, and Dalton, the $100,000 payment requirement—properly characterized as a condition on entry under § 212(f)/§ 215(a)—has a credible path to survive judicial review.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285586)

too many Indians who then hire nothing but Indians

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284915)

he really knows his supporteers are just dumb as shit

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284954)

Almost certainly illegal and likely to be struck down in court. Congress has only authorized the government to set fees to recover the cost of adjudicating the application. There is no statutory authority to impose fees designed to limit the use of a visa.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49284998)

1800000000000000000000000000 FUCK SHIT EATING DRAVIDIAN TURDS

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285005)

CR this is why America hasn't participated in a war for many decades now. Congress has simply refused to declare war. One weird trick!

*drools on self*

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285223)

Lmao @ Tommy literally MELTING DOWN AND LOSING HIS GODDAMN MOTHERFUCKING MIND ITT.

We love to see it, don't we, folx?!

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285225)

but thanks for your concern

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285883)

- American market is huge, tech is only 10-15% of the overall economy. You are greatly overestimating importance of these turds

- Even if all these jobs don’t come back it should ease pressures on domestic housing

- If these Indians can do these jobs in India why do companies choose to bring them over?

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285888)

all fortune 500 comps are tech comps now, even walmart is a tech comp basically as it derives so much from online sales and needs tech for other shit like inventory

the amt of h1b is just a few 100k, it will have no impact on housing u retarded pedo worshipper

the comps already have increasingly been moving jerbs to india, go read abt GCC, ever furking big US comp has a GCC in furking india now.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285905)

3. Predicted Migration of Jobs

Let’s assume ~85,000 H-1Bs are issued annually (the cap, plus some exemptions).

Today, perhaps 60–70% are filled by Indian nationals.

If the $100k fee stands:

Maybe 10–20% of those hires still go through (for critical, unique roles).

80–90% vanish, with those jobs shifting offshore.

Numbers:

Out of ~60k Indian H-1B slots annually → only ~10k would survive.

~50k jobs/year would instead be created in India or in alternative hubs.

4. Macro Impact

Over 5 years → ~250k jobs shift away from the U.S. to India and elsewhere.

India’s IT services export market ($250B+) would absorb much of this demand.

Canada & Mexico could also see big booms as “nearshore” options, since U.S. firms will want time-zone overlap without the fee.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285912)

It’s so good it definitely came from Stephen Miller.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285933)

its hilarous, u are gonna destroy the US tech industry then cheer that it wasnt needed or NBD

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777658&forum_id=2:#49285939)