Am reading "The Big Short" for the first time ...
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Date: December 12th, 2025 10:31 PM
Author: ,.,,.,.,,,,,,.....................
Very entertaining read. One thing that jumps out at me is how objectively brilliant Mike Burry is. I kind of thought he was a guy who made one good call, but he was making huge returns long before that and had Wall Street investment banks throwing money at him back when he was still a medical resident posting his views on investment message boards.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5809745&forum_id=2],#49506096) |
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Date: December 12th, 2025 10:43 PM
Author: ,.,,.,.,,,,,,.....................
Maybe, but it also seems possible that the public has gotten so trained to "buy the dip" and that "number go up" that bubbles are far more resilient than they used to be. That the "dumb money" is so powerful that it overwhelms correct analysis of things like the depreciation costs that AI companies face long-term. But if he's right about that, then those are facts which will eventually manifest themselves and can't be papered over.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5809745&forum_id=2],#49506109) |
Date: December 12th, 2025 10:45 PM
Author: ,.,,.,.,,,,,,.....................
Right from the start, Scion Capital was madly, almost comically, successful. By the middle of 2005, over a period in which the broad stock market index had fallen by 6.84 percent, Burry’s fund was up 242 percent and he was turning away investors.
Lewis, Michael. The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (Movie Tie-in Editions Book 0) . W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5809745&forum_id=2],#49506113) |
Date: December 12th, 2025 10:46 PM
Author: ,.,,.,.,,,,,,.....................
This method of attracting funds suited Mike Burry. More to the point, it worked. He’d started Scion Capital with a bit more than a million dollars—the money from his mother and brothers and his own million, after tax. In his first full year, 2001, the S&P 500 fell 11.88 percent. Scion was up 55 percent. The next year, the S&P 500 fell again, by 22.1 percent, and yet Scion was up again: 16 percent. The next year, 2003, the stock market finally turned around and rose 28.69 percent, but Mike Burry beat it again—his investments rose by 50 percent. By the end of 2004, Mike Burry was managing $600 million and turning money away. “If he’d run his fund to maximize the amount he had under management, he’d have been running many, many billions of dollars,” says a New York hedge fund manager who watched Burry’s performance with growing incredulity.
Lewis, Michael. The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (Movie Tie-in Editions Book 0) . W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5809745&forum_id=2],#49506114)
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Date: December 12th, 2025 10:53 PM
Author: ,.,,.,.,,,,,,.....................
It surprised him that Deutsche Bank didn’t seem to care which bonds he picked to bet against. From their point of view, so far as he could tell, all subprime mortgage bonds were the same. The price of insurance was driven not by any independent analysis but by the ratings placed on the bond by the rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.* If he wanted to buy insurance on the supposedly riskless triple-A-rated tranche, he might pay 20 basis points (0.20 percent); on the riskier A-rated tranches, he might pay 50 basis points (0.50 percent); and, on the even less safe triple-B-rated tranches, 200 basis points—that is, 2 percent. (A basis point is one-hundredth of one percentage point.) The triple-B-rated tranches—the ones that would be worth zero if the underlying mortgage pool experienced a loss of just 7 percent—were what he was after. He felt this to be a very conservative bet, which he was able, through analysis, to turn into even more of a sure thing.
Anyone who even glanced at the prospectuses could see that there were many critical differences between one triple-B bond and the next—the percentage of interest-only loans contained in their underlying pool of mortgages, for example. He set out to cherry-pick the absolute worst ones, and was a bit worried that the investment banks would catch on to just how much he knew about specific mortgage bonds, and adjust their prices. Once again they shocked and delighted him: Goldman Sachs e-mailed him a great long list of crappy mortgage bonds to choose from. “This was shocking to me, actually,” he says. “They were all priced according to the lowest rating from one of the big three ratings agencies.” He could pick from the list without alerting them to the depth of his knowledge. It was as if you could buy flood insurance on the house in the valley for the same price as flood insurance on the house on the mountaintop.
Lewis, Michael. The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (Movie Tie-in Editions Book 0) . W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5809745&forum_id=2],#49506130)
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Date: December 12th, 2025 10:55 PM
Author: ,.,,.,.,,,,,,.....................
A guy who does his homework like this in a manner that made Goldman Sachs look like dumb money is not someone who should be lightly disregarded, imo.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5809745&forum_id=2],#49506133) |
Date: December 12th, 2025 10:56 PM
Author: ,.,,.,.,,,,,,.....................
For weeks he hounded Bank of America until they agreed to sell him $5 million in credit default swaps. Twenty minutes after they sent their e-mail confirming the trade, they received another back from Burry: “So can we do another?” In a few weeks Mike Burry bought several hundred million dollars in credit default swaps from half a dozen banks, in chunks of $5 million. None of the sellers appeared to care very much which bonds they were insuring. He found one mortgage pool that was 100 percent floating-rate negative-amortizing mortgages—where the borrowers could choose the option of not paying any interest at all and simply accumulate a bigger and bigger debt until, presumably, they defaulted on it. Goldman Sachs not only sold him insurance on the pool but sent him a little note congratulating him on being the first person, on Wall Street or off, ever to buy insurance on that particular item. “I’m educating the experts here,” Burry crowed in an e-mail.
Lewis, Michael. The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (Movie Tie-in Editions Book 0) . W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5809745&forum_id=2],#49506134)
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Date: December 12th, 2025 11:49 PM
Author: ........,,,,,,......,.,.,.,,,,,,,,,,
I dont care for much of the big short movie, or people saying the Wall Street bros need to go to prison over the financial crisis, or people who talk about what a genius Murry is.
I think the definitive scene from the movie the Big Short is where they talk to the stripper who owns 3-4 houses.
Whether the anecdote is rue or not, Wall Street thought that mortgage loans would perform in the same way they had for 50 years - and Burry realized the retail banks were taking advantage of this and underwriting loans differently than they had the past 50 years.
Kudos to him for doing this, but you can see why it hasn't served him well since then. He just shouts dumb stuff like "AI is overvalued" - as if a significant number of investors arent considering that. 2008 was a unique scenario where he identified an area where the banks werent actually aware of the actual risks.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5809745&forum_id=2],#49506193) |
Date: December 13th, 2025 12:03 AM
Author: ,.,,.,.,,,,,,.....................
This ape who led the department at AIG insurance that was buying most of these CDOs may be more responsible than anyone for the crash. He would bully employees who questioned buying this garbage into submission:
Park put two and two together and guessed that the nature of these piles of consumer loans insured by AIG FP was changing, that they contained a lot more subprime mortgages than anyone knew, and that if U.S. homeowners began to default in sharply greater numbers, AIG didn’t have anywhere near the capital required to cover the losses. When he brought this up at a meeting, his reward was to be hauled into a separate room by Joe Cassano, who screamed at him that he didn’t know what he was talking about. That Joe Cassano, the boss of AIG FP, was the son of a police officer and had been a political science major at Brooklyn College seems, in retrospect, far less relevant than his need for obedience and total control. He’d spent most of his career, first at Drexel Burnham and then at AIG FP, not as a bond trader but working in the back office. Across AIG FP the view of the boss was remarkably consistent: Cassano was a guy with a crude feel for financial risk but a real talent for bullying people who doubted him. “AIG FP became a dictatorship,” says one London trader. “Joe would bully people around. He’d humiliate them and then try to make it up to them by giving them huge amounts of money.”
Lewis, Michael. The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (Movie Tie-in Editions Book 0) . W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5809745&forum_id=2],#49506208) |
Date: December 13th, 2025 9:46 AM Author: Marshall W. Waller
I’ve read it three times. It’s great.
Michael Lewis just did several interviews with people from the book on his podcast Against the Rules.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5809745&forum_id=2],#49506472) |
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