I. Introduction

Critics maintain that posting on any racist, sexist, and classist online discussion board is immoral.[n1] Posters, these critics say, are degenerates. Dr. Brian Leiter, Professor of Jurisprudence at The University of Chicago, is one major critic; His analysis specifically targets the most prestigious law discussion board in the world, AutoAdmit.com (hereinafter “xo”). However, the reasons given in support are not grounded on genuine moral arguments. The closest these critics get to a moral theory is ethical relativism—cultural relativism, in particular. But if this is true, then their contentions are begging the question because they posit, without justification, that ethical relativism is indubitably true.

My thesis in this paper is twofold: One, I will argue that the meta-ethical theory, Error Theory, is the only sound moral theory. By implication, I will reject moral objectivism and ethical relativism. Two, I will reason, based on an Error Theorist view, that posting on xo is not immoral.

II. Error Theory: The Only Sound Moral Theory

Before I give an account of Error Theory, I will first flesh out moral objectivism and moral skepticism. I will proceed by rejecting moral objectivism. The two branches of moral skepticism—ethical relativism and moral nihilism—will then be discussed. The strongest objections against ethical relativism will be given, and I will explain why they are sufficient to dismiss ethical relativism entirely. Lastly, I will entertain the two branches of moral nihilism: Error Theory and expressivism. I will settle with the former to advance into Section III. of this paper.

Ethical objectivism is the view that moral principles are objectively true. For something to be objectively true is to exist irrespective of societal norms, individual beliefs, or “common sense.”[n2] For example, logical syllogisms and mathematics are objective truths; they do not require people to believe in them to exist. An asteroid could destroy earth, killing all living species and organisms; yet, logic and mathematics would continue in existence. But can the same hold true for morality?

Ethicist Peter A. Graham presents the most sophisticated account for objective morality. His case for objectivism is delivered in two parts: First, we falsely believe certain moral obligations based on partial knowledge; but upon reaching a perfect state of knowledge, we will discern objective moral obligations.[n3] Second, he argues, rather eloquently, that humans inquire—when reflecting on a moral obligation—the right course of action. We think to ourselves in third-person: what am I morally required to do? The point is: we wouldn’t think about correct moral obligations in third-person if they weren’t, in fact, objective.[n4] For what other reason, Graham says, would we do this?

Although compelling at first, Graham’s account is severely flawed. Part one takes for granted that upon reaching a perfect state of knowledge about one’s duty, one will discern an objective moral responsibility. This assumes that complete knowledge of a duty is equivalent to moral responsibility. I can have full information of my duty to be kind to others, yet, how does that make it an objective moral obligation? Further, I may think it’s indeed my objective moral obligation, but my belief could be erroneous. Part one, therefore, fails. In part two, Graham ignores the possibility that we inquire the right course of action because of self-interested desires. That is, I may deliberately inquire the right course of action because I want to make sure I execute an action correctly, which I, in turn, will receive major dividends for a flawless outcome, whilst fulfilling my self-interested desires. Therefore, part two fails as well. Moral objectivism, then, is unsound.

Moral skepticism is an alternative moral theory to moral objectivism. This theory has two branches: moral nihilism and ethical relativism. I will begin with the latter. Ethical relativism is the view that cultures or individuals determine correct moral standards.[n5] They claim that a moral action is right if and only if a society approves of it. So you could live in a place where the enslavement of a particular race or gender is morally permissible as long as society approves. Likewise, you could live in a place where the killing of certain groups of people on a daily-basis is morally permissible, again, as long as society approves. But this seems odd and arbitrary.

Indeed, moral skepticism, like moral objectivism, is problematic. The strongest objection against moral skepticism is that it’s too arbitrary.[n6] Suppose you live in a society where it is morally permissible to have sex in public. In a couple of years, said society no longer approves of sex in public, so it becomes morally impermissible. This is odd because morality now appears superficial; it’s like popularity: one day you have it, and another day you don’t. Moreover, societies may believe in moral principles based on ignorance, prejudice, or narrow-minded thinking. [n7] For example, a society whose citizens all have middling IQs could approve the most egregious moral principles, yet ethical relativists would not care! Ethical relativism has extreme and atrocious implications. Therefore, it is not a sound moral theory.

Finally, I turn to moral nihilism. This theory has two branches: Error Theory and expressivism. Error Theory is the view that moral principles do not exist; nothing is morally good, so nothing can be right or wrong.[n8] Further, this theory asserts that moral claims like “Murder is wrong” are erroneous because there is no moral truth, these claims are, thus, false. Hence, morality is based on an error. Similarly, expressivism is the view that moral principles do not exist.

The difference between these two moral theories is that expressivism, unlike Error Theory, maintains that moral claims are not subject to any error. Moral claims do not aim to describe how the world ought to be; rather, moral claims express our feelings and emotions. The claim, “Torture is immoral” is, according to expressivists, merely saying, “Don’t torture!” or “I find torture unpleasant!”

While expressivism is compelling, there is one major problem with this moral theory. Expressivists distinguish themselves from Error Theorists specifically because they think moral claims have meaning—i.e. to express feelings and emotions. But if this is true, then these claims cannot be called “moral” claims; they must be dubbed, simply, as “claims.” Expressivists do not make this distinction. Error Theorists, nevertheless, do differentiate. They say that moral claims are false because there are no moral principles, but it permits the use of “claims” for the expression of feelings.

One challenge against Error Theory is that it condones behavior like murder, rape, and robbery. But this is false. Error Theory only says there is no right or wrong. An Error Theorists can respond by saying that murder, rape, and robbery are unpleasant, and this is sufficient to eschew said behavior. Another objection is that universal acceptance of Error Theory will lead to catastrophic results.[n9] Yet, this objection does not weaken Error Theory because it doesn’t show that there are indeed moral principles and our moral claims are truth functional. Therefore, Error Theory is the only sound moral theory.

III. xo Critics’ View of Morality

Thus far in this paper I have explained ethical objectivism, the view that moral principles are objectively true. I rejected this moral theory on the basis that its most sophisticated defense is severely flawed. Ethical relativism—the view that societies and humans are authors of moral principles—is explained and rejected on the basis of atrocious implications. Moral nihilism is described; and I explain why Error Theory, although imperfect, is the only sound moral theory. In this section, I will entertain and outline xo critics’ view of morality; their views will be rejected on account of fallacious reasoning.

Leiter, the most vehement critic of xo, makes the following argument:

P1) Posting on any racist, sexist, and classist discussion board is immoral

P2) xo is a racist, sexist, and classist discussion board

- - - - - - - - -

C) Posting on xo is immoral [n10]

Under the principle of charity, let’s suppose premise 2 is true. If premise 1 is also true, then Leiter’s argument is sound, and posting on xo is indeed immoral. But premise 1 is false, and in addition, it begs the question. Leiter argues in a circle because he assumes the existence of moral principles: he presupposes that ethical relativism is correct. In Section II. of this paper, I showed why ethical relativism is not true (because it leads to atrocious implications). Leiter is basing his argument on society’s disapproval of racist, sexist, and classist language. But if society were in favor of such language, would Leiter believe in its moral permissibility? Judging from his argument above, I certainly think he would. Premise 1 is indubitably false; Leiter’s argument fails.

Another critic argues that it’s morally wrong to post on xo because it perpetuates gendered violence and “what is impermissible in the real world should not be permitted in the virtual world.” [n11] This argument’s major flaw is the assumption that the perpetuation of gendered violence is immoral in the real world. As stated above, there are no moral principles: gendered violence is neither moral nor immoral. Therefore this argument is erroneous.

Lastly, Michelle Morris of University of Virginia Law School maintains that law school and bar applications must “request a three-year history of online aliases, e-mail addresses, IP addresses, blogs, and social networking site profile information” in order to screen applicants who may have engaged in immoral online behavior.[n12] But like the two arguments above, this critic presupposes the existence of moral principles. Moral truths do not exist. Therefore, this argument makes an error and is unsound.

My argument in this paper can be summarized as follows:

P1) If there are no moral principles, then there is no right or wrong

P2) Moral claims are true only when there is a right or wrong

P3) There are no moral principles

P4) Our moral claims are always false

SC5) The moral claim: “posting on xo is immoral” is false

- - - - -

C) Posting on xo is not immoral

Although critics cannot claim that posting on xo is immoral, they are permitted to say that posting on xo is unpleasant, weird, geeky, or insane. Moreover, they can express their distaste of the website by not talking to individuals who post. Error Theorists would not see this behavior as a problem, as long as critics do not claim that posting on xo is immoral.

But why do people post on xo? What is the point of authoring a thread filled with racist, sexist, and classist language? Anthony Ciolli makes the distinction between writing on a blog and writing as a journalist.[n13] The latter must adhere to societal norms and cultural values; the former does not. Why? Ciolli argues that writing on a blog is akin to writing in a diary; the major difference is the sharing of diary entries with anonymous individuals. Diaries need not conform to conventions or societal standards. Indeed, xo is like a diary—with entries that steal posters’ hearts, captivate and enthrall imaginations, and move readers to smiles, chills, or tears.

IV. Conclusion

This paper rejects moral objectivism and ethical relativism. An account of Error Theory is given and its challenges are presented. The challenges are later dismissed. I proceed by describing certain moral claims and show why, under an Error Theorists view, they are fallacious in their reasoning. Lastly, I outline my argument in argument form to make clear why posting on xo is not immoral.

Notes:

n1. In accordance with modern word usage in analytic philosophy, I will use “ethics” and “morals” interchangeably.

n2. Anderson, Owen. "Moral objectivity and responsibility in ethics: A socratic response to Hume's legacy in the 20th century." The Heythrop Journal 51, no. 2 (2010): 178-191, p. 180.

n3. Graham, Peter A. "In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation*." Ethics 121, no. 1 (2010): 88-115, p.91

n4. Id. at p. 92.

n5. May, Joshua. "Skeptical hypotheses and moral skepticism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43, no. 3 (2013), 341-359, p. 355.

n6. Id. at p. 357

n7. Id. at p. 359

n8. Bloomfield, Paul. "Error Theory and the Concept of Morality." Metaphilosophy 44, no. 4 (2013): 451-469, p. 455.

n9. Id. at p. 459.

n10. Leiter, Brian. “Penn Law Student.” Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog, (2007) http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2005/03/penn_law_studen.html.

n11. Heller, Brittan. "Of legal rights and moral wrongs: a case study of internet defamation." Yale JL & Feminism 19 (2007): 279-285, p. 282.

n12. Morris, Michelle. "The Legal Profession, Personal Responsibility, and the Internet." Yale LJ Pocket Part 117 (2007): 53.

n13. Ciolli, Anthony. "Defamatory Internet Speech: A Defense of the Status Quo." QLR 25 (2006): 853-863, p. 854.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=2830012&forum_id=2#27489239)