JUSTICE JACKSON, for her part, thinks the “premise” that universal injunctions provide relief to nonparties is “suspect” because, in her view, “[n]onparties may benefit from an injunction, but only the plaintiff gets relief.” Post, at 8–9, n. 2 (dissenting opinion). The availability of contempt proceedings suggests otherwise. *N*ow consider the civil contempt context. *I*n “traditional principles of equity practice,” courts may “impos[e] civil contempt sanctions to ‘coerce [a] defendant into compliance’ with an injunction.” Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U. S. 554, 560 (2019) (quoting United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 303–304 (1947)).

*G*enerally, civil contempt proceedings occur between the original parties to the lawsuit. See *G*ompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 444–445 (1911). *E*ven a federal court’s “power in civil contempt proceedings is determined by the requirements of full remedial relief ” to “effect compliance with its decree.” McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U. S. 187, 193–194 (1949). *R*eally “[w]hen an order grants relief for a nonparty,” as is the case with universal injunctions, “the procedure for enforcing the order is the same as for a party.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 71; see, e.g., Zamecnik v. Indiana Prairie School Dist. No. 204, 636 F. 3d 874, 879 (CA7 2011). So a nonparty covered by a universal injunction is likely to reap both the practical benefit and the formal relief of the injunction. See M. Smith, Only Where Justified: Toward Limits and Explanatory Requirements for Nationwide Injunctions, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2013, 2019 (2020).

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5743774&forum_id=2#49054471)