I. Background[2]

Plaintiff, who is Norwegian and identifies as nonbinary,[3] was born with thrombocytopenia with absent radius, also known as "TAR Syndrome." Am. Compl. at 3;[4] Def. SUMF ¶¶ 7, 8. From October 8, 2021 through October 28, 2021, Plaintiff worked for Fat Dough at its Fort Drum location on at at-will basis. Def. SUMF. ¶¶ 5, 6, 9, 10, 15. Plaintiff was hired as a delivery driver, and his duties included delivering pizzas, washing dishes, and helping with the front counter. Id. at ¶ 11.

On Plaintiff's first day of work, Richard Filkins, a Fat Dough manager, showed Plaintiff where he would deliver pizza. Def. SUMF ¶ 20; Plaintiff's Deposition (Pl. Dep.) at 26, Dkt. No. 84-3. According to Plaintiff, during this tour Filkins told him that if he delivered pizzas to a certain part of the base, then he risked having soldiers "require [Plaintiff] to give them oral sex." Pl. Dep. at 18. Defendant does not address this in its Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, but states that Filkins did not ask Plaintiff to perform oral sex. Id. at 18; Def. SUMF ¶ 21. Plaintiff does not refer to any other conversations involving sex.

The parties dispute whether a delivery driver who Plaintiff "shadowed" for one or two days, Megan Scott, asked a question about Plaintiff's national origin and then stole money that he had to replace. Def. SUMF ¶ 22; Pl. Dep. at 27-28; Am. Compl. at 3; Dkt. No. 84-12 ¶¶ 15, 20.

Plaintiff worked from 2 p.m. to 11 p.m. until he told the general manager that he has "difficulty seeing at night," and the general manager gave him earlier shifts. Def. SUMF ¶¶ 28-30; Pl. Dep. at 11-12. In addition, within three days of when he started working for Fat Dough, Plaintiff asked that he not deliver pizzas because he did not feel safe at Ft. Drum after someone told him that he could not enter any buildings on Ft. Drum when he tried to deliver a pizza to a barracks. Pl. Dep. at 15-16; Def. SUMF ¶ 31-32.

Plaintiff claims that on October 27th, another employee threw dirty water and mushrooms at Plaintiff while Plaintiff was washing dishes. Am. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff also claims that on approximately October 28th, someone broke into his car[5] in a parking lot and drew a "smiley face" on the inside of his windshield with pizza grease. Def. SUMF ¶ 33, 35-36, 40; Pl. Dep. at 18-19. Plaintiff reported the break-in to both his supervisor, Pl. Dep. at 19, and the Fort Drum Police, Dkt. No. 87-4 at 60. According to the supervisor, he interviewed employees and inspected Plaintiff's car, but he saw "an area of dew" on the windshield, and he did not find any evidence of a break-in. Def. SUMF ¶¶ 34, 37-39; Dkt. No. 84-11 ¶¶ 22-25. According to Plaintiff, there were security cameras,[6] and the supervisor did not review them, Pl. Dep. at 20-21, but according to the supervisor, there were no security cameras on the side of the building where Plaintiff parked, and he told Plaintiff that. Dkt. No. 84-11 ¶¶ 21, 24. The police report states that "Brown had cleaned the grease up himself and there was no further reported or visible damage to the vehicle." Dkt. No. 87-4 at 60.

Plaintiff also reported to both his supervisor and the police that he overheard other employees discuss slashing his tires. Def. SUMF ¶¶ 42. After investigating, the supervisor determined that "drivers were discussing putting snow tires on their personal vehicles." Id. ¶ 43. Plaintiff's tires were never slashed. Id. ¶ 44.

On approximately October 25, 2021, Plaintiff told a supervisor than he was resigning with two weeks of notice. Def. SUMF ¶¶ 45, 46; Pl. Dep. at 32. The supervisor responded that Plaintiff "would be welcome back" and that "they would allow [Plaintiff] to come back for more shifts if [Plaintiff] needed to." Pl. Dep. at 33. According to Fat Dough, the resignation was "voluntary," but Plaintiff claims that it was "coerced by ongoing harassment and discriminatory practices." Dkt. No. 87-3 ¶ 45 (p. 31). According to Plaintiff, supervisor Brian Galloway called him on October 29, 2021, the day after the windshield incident, and terminated his employment because Plaintiff filed a police report.[7] Dkt. No. 87-3 ¶5-13 (p. 4-5); Dkt. No. 87-4 at 60; Pl. Dep. at 32. Plaintiff provided a screenshot from his cell phone to prove that this call occurred, but the screenshot only shows two outgoing calls to "Domino's" on October 29, 2021, and no incoming calls. Dkt. No 87-4 at 59. According to Galloway, Galloway did not fire Plaintiff, Dkt. No. 84-10 at ¶ 9, and Plaintiff called Galloway to tell him that Plaintiff would not work his last two shifts because UPS had hired Plaintiff, id. at ¶ 10.

Plaintiff began working for UPS on November 1, 2021. Def. SUMF ¶ 49.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56(a), summary judgment may be granted only if all the submissions taken together "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and is genuinely in dispute "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson). The movant may meet this burden by showing that the nonmoving party has "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party fails to "`come forth with evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to return a verdict in his or her favor on' an essential element of a claim" (quoting In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 2010))).

If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must "set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24; Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). "When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant." Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003). Still, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and cannot rely on "mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment," Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Quarles v. Gen. Motors Corp., 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, "[m]ere conclusory allegations or denials . . . cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact where none would otherwise exist." Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995)).

When considering cross-motions for summary judgment, a court "must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration." Hotel Emp. & Rest. Emp. Union, Local 100 of New York, N.Y. & Vicinity v. City of New York Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 543 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Heublein v. United States, 996 F.2d 1455, 1461 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court "reads his pleadings `liberally and interpret[s] them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Recs., 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999)). The "application of this different standard does not relieve plaintiff of his duty to meet the requirements necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Id.

"While it is undoubtedly the duty of district courts not to weigh the credibility of the parties at the summary judgment stage, in the rare circumstance where the plaintiff relies almost exclusively on his own testimony, much of which is contradictory and incomplete, it will be impossible for a district court to determine whether the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff, and thus whether there are any `genuine' issues of material fact, without making some assessment of the plaintiff's account." Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 554 (cleaned up). "[W]hen the facts alleged are so contradictory that doubt is cast upon their plausibility," a court is "authorized to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations, dispose of some improbable allegations, and dismiss the claim." Aziz Zarif Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F. Supp. 460, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992)) (cleaned up).

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment and Sanctions[8]

1. Sanctions

Plaintiff seeks sanctions against Defendant for allegedly harassing Plaintiff with counterclaims and "retaliatory conduct." Dkt. Nos. 80 at 2; 88 at 1. Plaintiff's initial motion for sanctions was denied, Dkt. No. 81, and Plaintiff raises largely the same arguments in his renewed motion, Dkt. No. 88.

Plaintiff's renewed motion is mostly conclusory language without any factual assertions that could support his request. In addition, contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, Defendant did not file any counterclaims against Plaintiff. Finally, Plaintiff has not described any specific "retaliatory conduct." Dkt. No. 88 at 3. Plaintiff's renewed motion for sanctions is therefore denied.

It appears, however, that Plaintiff could be sanctioned because he included at least one fictitious legal citation in his submissions: "Lynch v. U.S. Postal Service, 2016 WL 7338415 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016)." Dkt. No. 80 at 4. That Westlaw citation is for an unrelated habeas corpus case: Green v. New York, No. 14-cv-2073, 2016 WL 7338415 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016). Although there are several cases with the caption, "Lynch v. U.S. Postal Service," none were issued by this court or in 2016. See Lynch v. U.S. Postal Serv., 17 F. App'x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Lynch v. U.S. Postal Serv., 3 F. App'x 287 (6th Cir. 2001); Lynch v. U.S. Postal Serv., 127 F. App'x 487 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Lynch v. U.S. Postal Serv., 316 F. App'x 972 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

All litigants, including pro se litigants, must make sure that all assertions of fact and law in their submissions are true. Fed R. Civ. P. 11(b). If a litigant cannot verify a legal assertion, the litigant should omit the assertion rather than include a false statement. Plaintiff testified that he used ChatGPT to draft legal papers. Dkt. No. 89-1 at 5-10. It is well established that artificial intelligence regularly "hallucinates" and includes false statements. See Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 2:24-cv-7399, 2025 WL 1195925 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2025) ("In recent years, courts across the country have continued to receive submissions littered with AI-generated `case' citations . . . . This epidemic of citing fake cases has continued unabated, and, by way of example, the undersigned has identified at least four reported cases in the recent weeks confronting this very same issue.") (collecting cases); see also Jeff Neal, The Legal Profession in 2024: AI, HARV. L. TODAY (Feb. 14, 2024), https://hls.harvard.edu/today/harvard-law-expert-explains-how-ai-may-transform-the-legal-profession-in-2024/.

The Court has decided not to impose sanctions at this time, but Plaintiff is cautioned that he faces a substantial risk of sanctions if he continues to use artificial intelligence without carefully verifying all citations.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5793510&forum_id=2.#49401871)